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Abstract
We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in the load balancing
games of m (m  2) identical servers, in which every job chooses one
of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the
workload of the server it chooses.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a strategy prole that is resilient to uni-
lateral deviations. Finding an NE in such a game is simple. However,
an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several
jobs, while a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) is. We study how well an
NE approximates an SNE.
Given any job assignment in a load balancing game, the improvement
ratio (IR) of a deviation of a job is dened as the ratio between the pre-
and post-deviation costs. An NE is said to be a -approximate SNE
(  1) if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition
will have an IR more than  from coordinated deviations of the coalition.
While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-
server load balancing game, we prove that, in the m-server load balancing
game for any given m  3, any NE is a (5=4)-approximate SNE, which
together with the lower bound already established in the literature im-
plies that the approximation bound is tight. This closes the nal gap in
the literature on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in
the load balancing games. To establish our upper bound, we apply with
novelty a powerful graph-theoretic tool.
Keywords: load balancing game, Nash equilibrium, strong Nash equi-
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1 Introduction
In game theory, a fundamental notion is Nash equilibrium (NE), which is such a
state that is stable against deviations of any individual game players (agents) in
the sense that any such deviation will not bring about benet to the deviator.
Much stronger stability is exhibited by a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE), a
notion introduced by Aumann [3], at which no coalition of agents exists such
that each member of the coalition can benet from coordinated deviations by
the members of the coalition.
Evidentally selsh individual agents stand to benet from cooperation and
hence SNEs are much more preferred to NEs for stability. However, SNEs do not
necessarily exist [2] and, even if they do, they are much more dicult to identify
and to compute [7, 4]. It is therefore very much desirable to have the advantages
of both computational eciency and strong stability, which motivates our study
in this paper. We establish that, for general NE job assignments in the load
balancing games, which exist and are easy to compute, their loss of strong
stability possessed by SNEs is at most 25%.
In a load balancing game, there are n selsh agents, each representing one
of a set J = fJ1;    ; Jng of n jobs. In the absence of a coordinating authority,
each agent must choose one ofm identical servers,M = f1; : : : ;mg, to assign his
job to in order to complete the job as soon as possible. All jobs assigned to the
same server will nish at the same time, which is determined by the workload
of the server, dened to be the total processing time of the jobs assigned to the
server. Let job Jj have a processing time pj (1  j  n) and let Si denote
the set of jobs assigned to server i (1  i  m). For convenience, we will use
\agent" and \job" interchangeably, and consider job processing time also as
their \lengths". The completion time cj of job Jj 2 Si is the workload of its
server: Li =
P
Jj2Si pj .
NEs in the load balancing games have been widely studied (see, e.g., [8, 11,
6, 10, 5]) with the main focus of quantifying their loss of global optimality in
terms of the price of anarchy, a term coined by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[11], as largely summarized in [12]. In this paper, we study NEs in the load
balancing games from a dierent perspective by quantifying their loss of strong
stability.
We focus on pure NEs, those corresponding to deterministic job assignments
in load balancing games. Finding such an NE is simple and identication of an
SNE is strongly NP-hard, while high-quality NEs are easily computed [4]. Given
any job assignment in a load balancing game, the improvement ratio (IR) of a
deviation of a job is dened as the ratio between the pre- and post-deviation
costs. An NE is said to be a -approximate SNE (  1) (which is called -SE
in [1]) if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have
an IR more than  from coordinated deviations of the coalition. Clearly, the
stability of NE improves with a decreased value of  and a 1-approximate SNE
is in fact an SNE itself.
For the load balancing game of two servers, one can easily verify that every
NE is also an SNE [2]. If there are three or four servers in the game, then
it is proved in [7] and [4], respectively, that any NE assignment is a (5=4)-
approximate SNE, and the bound is tight. Furthermore, it is a (2  2=(m+1))-
approximate SNE if the game has m servers for m  5 [7].
We establish in this paper that, in them-server load balancing game (m  3),
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any NE is a (5=4)-approximate SNE, which is tight and hence closes the nal
gap in the literature on the study of NE approximation of SNE in the load
balancing games. To establish our approximation bound, we apply with novelty
a powerful graph-theoretic tool.
2 Denitions and Preliminaries
2.1 Graph-theoretic Tool [4]
As a tool of our analysis, we start with the minimal deviation graph intro-
duced by Chen [4]. For convenience we collect into this subsection some ba-
sic results on minimal deviation graph from [4]. Given an NE job assignment
S = fSi : i 2Mg and a coalition   of agents (or simply, of jobs), as an NE-based
coalitional deviation or simply coalitional deviation, we refer to a collective ac-
tion in which each job of the coalition migrates from its server based on S with
a decreased completion time. We introduce deviation graphs to characterize
coalitional deviations. In a coalitional deviation, a server i is said to be partici-
pating or involved if its job set changes after the deviation. Given a coalitional
deviation  = ( ) of a coalition  , we dene the corresponding (directed)
deviation graph G() = (V;A) as follows:
V = V (G) := fi : server i is a participating serverg;
A = A(G) := f(u; v) : a job Jj 2   migrates from Su to Svg:
Given a coalitional deviation , we denote by L0i = Li() the workload of server
i after deviation , and by IR() the minimum of the improvement ratios of all
jobs taking part in . For notational convenience, let vi = i for i = 1;    ;m.
Then we have the following denition and lemmas from [4]:
Lemma 1 The out-degree +(i) of any node i of a deviation graph is at least
1, and hence jSij  2.
Lemma 2 If all m servers are involved in a coalitional deviation, then the
deviation graph does not contain any node-disjoint directed cycles that span all
nodes.
Denition 1 Let   be a coalition and  be a coalitional deviation of  . De-
viation graph G = G() is said to be minimal if IR(0) < IR() for any
coalitional deviation 0 of  0 that is a proper subset of  .
Lemma 3 The in-degree  (i) of any node i of a minimal deviation graph is
at least 1.
Lemma 4 A minimal deviation graph is strongly connected.
2.2 Some Observations
In our study of bounding NE approximation of SNE, we can apparently focus
on those coalitional deviations that correspond to minimal deviation graphs.
We start with several observations on the coalitional deviation m of any NE-
based coalition   involvingm (m  3) servers, which has corresponding minimal
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deviation graph G(m). For notational simplicity, we omit subscript m for
coalitional deviation m involving all m servers that leads to minimal deviation
graph G(m). Hence V (G) =M .
If two jobs assigned to server i 2M in the NE assignment migrate to server
j 2 M (j 6= i) together, or do not migrate together, then we can treat them
as one single job without loss of generality in our study of minimal deviation
graph. With this understanding, if we let ai (i 2M) denote the number of jobs
assigned to server i in the NE assignment, then the following is immediate.
Observation 1 For any i 2 M , we have 2  ai  m. +(i) = ai or +(i) =
ai   1.
As a result of the above observation, the node set M can be partitioned into
two, M 0 and M 00, as follows:
M 0 := fi 2M : ai = +(i)g;
M 00 := MnM 0 = fi 2M : ai = +(i) + 1g:
By applying a data scaling if necessary, we assume that mini2M Li = 1 without
loss of generality.
Observation 2 For any i 2M , we have Li  ai=(ai   1).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that Li > ai=(ai   1), which implies that ai >
Li=(Li   1).
Let xi denote the length of the shortest job assigned to server i in the NE
assignment. We have Li  aixi, which leads to Li > Lixi=(Li   1), that is,
Li > xi + 1, which implies that the shortest job assigned to server i in the
NE assignment can have the benet of reducing its job completion time by
unilaterally migrating to the server of which the workload is 1, contradicting
the NE property. 
The following observation states that, if all jobs on a server participate in
the migration, then none of the servers they migrate to will have all its jobs
migrate out.
Observation 3 If (i; j) 2 A and i 2M 0, then j 2M 00.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that aj 6= +(j)+1. According to Observation 1,
we have aj = 
+(j), which implies that all the jobs assigned to server i and server
j in the NE assignment belong to coalition  .
Since (i; j) 2 A, there is a job Jk 2   that migrates from server i to server j.
Consider the new coalition  0 formed by all members of   except Jk. Then we
have ; 6=  0   . Let 0 be such a coalitional deviation of  0 that is the same
as  except without the involvement of Jk and the job(s) that migrate(s) to i
(resp. j) in  will migrate to j (resp. i) in 0. Then we have IR(0) = IR(),
contradicting the minimality of the deviation graph G according to Denition 1.

The following observation is a result of Observation 3:
Observation 4 Assume i; j 2 M 0. Hence (i; j); (j; i) 62 A according to Obser-
vation 3. Let 0 be the same as  except that any job that migrates to i (resp. j)
in  will migrate to j (resp. i) in 0. Then IR(0) = IR(), and G(0) is
minimal.
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3 Analysis of Minimal Deviation Graph
3.1 Auxiliary arc set eA and node set W
To help our analysis, we will introduce in this subsection a special arc set eA  A
in the minimal deviation graph G() and three node sets that eA determines:
W0, W1 and fW1.
For any node i 2 M , denote Q+(i) := fj 2 M : (i; j) 2 Ag and Q (i) :=
fj 2 M : (j; i) 2 Ag. For notational convenience, for any node set S  M , we
denote Q+(S) :=
S
i2S Q
+(i) and Q (S) :=
S
i2S Q
 (i). With A replaced byeA above, we similarly dene eQ+(i), eQ (i), eQ+(S) and eQ (S).
Let us formally dene eA as follows. According to Lemma 3, jQ (i)j  1 for
any i 2 M . For each i 2 M we pick up an arc from non-empty set Q (i) to
form an m-element subset eA  A. Then eA possesses the following properties,
where bi := j eQ+(i)j for any i 2M :
j eQ (i)j = 1 for any i 2M; (1)
mX
i=1
bi = j eAj = m: (2)
If node set S is a singleton, then we will also use S to denote the singleton
if no confusion can arise. Hence, due to (1) we will also use eQ (i) to denote
the single element of the corresponding set. Any arc set eA  A that satises
properties (1) and (2) is said to be tilde-valid. Immediately we have
Lemma 5 W0 := fi 2M : bi = 0g 6= ;.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that W0 = ;. Then any bi  1 in (2), which
implies that bi = 1 for any i 2M , so that eA forms some node-disjoint directed
cycles that span all nodes, contradicting Lemma 2. 
Note that, from the formation of arc set eA, it is clear that eA as a tilde-valid
arc set may not be unique. However, among all possible choices of tilde-valid
arc set eA  A, we choose one that has some additional properties in terms of
minimum cardinalities of some combinatorial structures, which we shall use a
sequence of three assumptions to describe. These assumptions are made without
loss of generality due to the niteness of the total number of tilde-valid arc sets.
Similarly, for a given coalition  , we shall also choose our coalitional deviation
 so that it has certain property (see Assumption 4).
Assumption 1 Arc set eA is tilde-valid and it minimizes jW0( eA)j.
Let fW0 = Q+(W0). Then fW0 6= ; according to Lemmas 5 and 1. A node
i 2 M is said to be associated with W0 if it is linked to an element of fW0
through a sequence of arcs in eA and A in alternation. More formally, i 2 M
is associated with W0 if and only if, for some integer k  0, there are nodes
fi0; : : : ; ik; j0; : : : ; jkg M with i = ik and j0 2 fW0, such that
(i0; j0); : : : ; (ik; jk) 2 eA and (i0; j1); : : : ; (ik 1; jk) 2 A: (3)
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Note that in the above denition, if i = ik is associated with W0, then i0, : : :,
ik 1 used in (3) are each associated with W0. Dene
W1 := fi 2M : node i is associated with W0g;fW1 := eQ+(W1):
Immediately we have eQ (fW0) W1, which implies that
fW0  fW1: (4)
On the other hand, since eQ (fW0) 6= ; according to (1), we have W1 6= ;.
Lemma 6 For any i 2W1, bi = 1. Furthermore, Q+(W0 [W1) = fW1.
Proof. It is clear from the denition that W1 \W0 = ;. Hence bi  1 for any
i 2 W1. Assume for contradiction that bi  2 for some i 2 W1. Since i is
associated with W0, in addition to nodes fi0; : : : ; ik; j0; : : : ; jkg  M satisfying
(3), we have a node h 2W0 such that (h; j0) 2 A according to the denition offW0. Now we remove k + 1 arcs (i0; j0); : : : ; (ik; jk) from eA and add k + 1 new
arcs (h; j0); (i0; j1); : : : ; (ik 1; jk) to eA. It is easy to see that the new set eA still
has properties (1) and (2). Additionally, under the new eA, all fbkg remain the
same except two of them: bh and bi, with the former increased by 1 and the
latter decreased by 1. Since bi  2 under the original eA, then i 62W0 under the
new eA. Consequently, the new W0 determined by the new eA contains a smaller
number of elements, contradicting Assumption 1 about the original eA.
To prove the second part of the lemma, we notice (4) and let i 2 W1 and
(i; j) 2 A. We show that j 2 fW1. In fact, since j eQ (j)j = 1 according to (1),
we have a node h 2 M such that (h; j) 2 eA. Now since i is associated with
W0, we conclude that h is also associated with W0, which implies that j 2 fW1.
Therefore, we have proved that Q+(W0 [W1)  fW1. The other direction of
inclusion is apparent. 
As a result of Lemma 6 and (1), mapping eQ+() from W1 onto fW1 is a
one-to-one correspondence and hence
jW1j = jfW1j > 0: (5)
Let
W :=W0 [W1 [fW1:
3.2 Decomposition of node set X
Recall that, for any i 2 M , ai is the number of jobs assigned to server i in the
NE assignment and bi = j eQ+(i)j for a xed arc set eA satisfying Assumption 1.
For a pair of integers a and b with 2  a  m and 0  b  a, let M ba := fi 2
M : ai = a; bi = bg. Then it is clear that[
2am
[
0ba
M ba =M: (6)
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As we will see in the next section, bounding the sizes of the sets M22 and M
3
3
is vital in our establishment of the desired approximation bound. We therefore
take a close look at the two sets by partitioning
X :=M22 [M33
into a number of subsets, so that dierent bounding arguments can be applied
to dierent subsets.
Notation 2 Let fM22 := f` 2 M22 : eQ+(`) * Wg. For convenience, we reserve
letter ` to exclusively index elements of fM22 and let eQ+(`) = f`1; `2g with the
understanding that it is always the case that `1 =2W .
For any ` 2 fM22 , `1 =2W implies b`1  1 since W0 W . On the other hand,
since arc (`; `1) 2 eA  A, we have a`1 = +(`1) + 1  b`1 + 1 according to
Observation 3, which implies that `1 must belong to one of the following three
mutually disjoint node sets:
Z1 := fi 2MnW : bi = 1g;
Z2 := fi 2MnW : bi > 1; ai > bi + 1g;
Z := fi 2MnW : bi > 1; ai = bi + 1g:
Therefore, if we dene8>>><>>>:
X3 := f` 2 fM22 : eQ+(`) \W = ;g;
X4 := f` 2 fM22 nX3 : `1 2 Z1 [ Z2g;
X5 := f` 2 fM22 nX3 : `1 2 Z;Q+(`1) *W;  (`1) > 1g;
X6 := f` 2 fM22 nX3 : `1 2 Z;Q+(`1) *W;  (`1) = 1g;
then we have
X11 := fM22 n 6[
k=3
Xk = f` 2 fM22 nX3 : `1 2 Z;Q+(`1) Wg:
Now let (
X1 := fi 2 X : eQ+(i) Wg [X11;
X2 := fi 2M33 : eQ+(i) *Wg:
Clearly, Xi \Xj = ; (1  i 6= j  6) and X =
S6
k=1Xk.
3.3 Bounding the size of node set X
3.3.1 Part 1
We continue our analysis of the node set X. Through a series of six lemmas, we
establish that the number of nodes in Xt is at most ctjYtj (t = 1; : : : ; 6), where
ct 2 f1; 12g and Y1; : : : ; Y6 MnX are mutually disjoint node sets to be dened
below.
Lemma 7 Let Y1 :=W1. Then jX1j  jY1j.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that jX1j > jY1j, that is, jX1j > jW1j = jfW1j
according to (5). Let X 01  X1 be a proper subset of jfW1j > 0 elements. Dene
K := WnfW1 W0 [W1;
K 0 := fk 2MnW : Q (k) \X 01 6= ;g;
 0 := fJj 2   : Jj 2
[
k2fM
Skg;
where fM := X 01 [ K [ K 0. Then  0 6= ; since X 01 6= ;. We claim  0 is a
proper subset of  . To see this, let i 2 X1nX 01 6= ;. Since X \ (W0 [W1) = ;
(Lemma 6), we have i =2 K. Observation 3 implies i =2 K 0. Therefore, we have
i =2 fM , i.e., Si \  0 = ;, but Si   .
Note that X 01 \fW1 = ; (denition of fW1 and Observation 3). On the other
hand, since jX 01j = jfW1j, we can assume there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the nodes (i.e., servers) of the two sets X 01 and fW1. Now let us dene
a new coalitional deviation 0 of  0, which is the same as  restricted on  0
except that, if Jj 2  0 migrates in  to a server of fW1, then let Jj migrate in
0 to the corresponding server of X 01.
We show that the improvement ratio of any job deviation in 0 is at least the
same as that in , which then implies that IR(0)  IR(), contradicting the
minimality of G = G() according to Denition 1. To this end, we only need
to show that the new coalitional deviation 0 takes place among the servers
assigned with jobs of the coalition  0, that is,
Q+(fM) W [K 0 = fW1 [K [K 0; (7)
so that benet of any job deviation will not decrease due to the fact that all
jobs on servers of X 01 migrate out in  and hence in 
0 as well, leaving empty
space for deviational jobs under 0, which originally migrate to servers of fW1
under .
First we have Q+(K)  fW1 according to Lemma 6. On the other hand, it
can be easily veried that Q+(X 01) W
S
K 0 according to the denition of K 0.
Now we show Q+(K 0)  W , which then implies (7). In fact, for any i 2 K 0,
noticing that X 01  X1, according to the denitions of K 0 and X1, we have
i 2 Q+(X11)nW , which implies that Q+(i) 2 W according to the denition of
X11. 
Since eQ+(i)nW 6= ; for any i 2 X2 according to the denition of X2, we
immediately have the following lemma thanks to Observation 3.
Lemma 8 Let Y2 :=
S
i2X2
eQ+(i)nW . Then Y2 M 00nW and jX2j  jY2j.
Note that j eQ+(`)j = 2 for any ` 2 X3 and eQ+(i)\ eQ+(j) = ; (i 6= j) due to
(1), which lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let Y3 :=
S
`2X3
eQ+(`). Then Y3 M 00nW and 2jX3j  jY3j.
The following lemma follows directly from the denition of X4:
Lemma 10 Let Y4 :=
S
`2X4
eQ+(`)nW . Then Y4  M 00nW and jX4j  jY4j.
For any j 2 Y4, bj > 1 and aj > bj + 1, unless bj = 1.
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At this point, we introduce the second additional assumption about eA with-
out loss of generality.
Assumption 2 Arc set eA is such that it rst satises Assumption 1 and then
minimizes jM22 ( eA)j.
For any ` 2 X5, since  (`1) > 1 according to the denition of X5, there is
j 2 Q (`1)nf`g. Then j =2W0[W1 (otherwise we would have `1 2W according
to Lemma 6). In fact, node j has the following property:
j 2M12 \M 0nW: (8)
To see this, consider replacing (`; `1) with (j; `1) in eA to form a new tilde-valid
arc set eA0. It is easy to see that eA0 satises Assumption 1. However, with the
new arc set eA0, ` is no longer a node in the new M22 ( eA0), which implies that j
has to become a node in M22 (
eA0) in order not to contradict Assumption 2 with
the original choice of eA, which in turn implies properties (8). Furthermore,
since j 2 M12 and (j; `1) 2 An eA, there is no k 6= `1 such that (j; k) 2 An eA,
which implies that j =2 Q 1( eQ+(`0)n)nf`0g. Consequently, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 11 Let Y5 :=
S
`2X5 Q
 ( eQ+(`)nW )nf`g. Then Y5 M12 \M 0nW and
jX5j  jY5j.
3.3.2 Part 2
The following two structures in graph G() with tilde-valid arc set eA play an
important role in deriving our next lemmas:

( eA) := fi 2M 0 : i1 = eQ 1(i) 2 eQ+(i);
 (i1) = 1; +(i1) = bi1 > 1g;
( eA) := f(i; i1; j) : i 2 fM22 nX3; i1 2 eQ+(`) \ eQ (j)nW;
i 6= j;  (i1) = 1; +(i1) = bi1 > 1; j 2M 0g:
Note that each element in 
( eA) represents a directed 2-cycles of both arcs in eA
and each element in ( eA) is a directed 2-path of both arcs in eA. In both cases
of 
( eA) and ( eA), the interior node i1 has an in-degree  (i1) = 1 and all its
out-arcs are in eA. Our next result is based on the following further renement
of the tilde-valid arc set eA.
Lemma 12 If 
( eA) 6= ; for some arc set eA satisfying Assumption 2, then there
exists an arc set eA0 such that, while it also satises Assumption 2, additionally,

( eA0) is a proper subset of 
( eA).
Proof. Assume i 2 
( eA) and let i1 = eQ 1(i) be as in the denition of 
( eA).
Then there must be a node h 2 Q (i) with h 6= i1, since otherwise  (i) =
 (i1) = 1, which implies that there would be no directed path from any other
nodes in G() to nodes i or i1, contradicting Lemma 4. Therefore, the following
set is not empty:
Hi := fh 2M : (h; i) 2 A; either  (h) > 1 or (h; i) =2 eAg: (9)
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Let h 2 Hi 6= ;. We dene a new tilde-valid arc seteA0 := f eAnf(i1; i)gg [ f(h; i)g: (10)
It is easily seen that i 2 
( eA)n
( eA0) and 
( eA0) [ fig = 
( eA). On the other
hand, eA0 still satises Assumption 1 due to bi1 > 1, and hence also satises
Assumption 2 since +(h) < ah (which implies that h =2 
( eA)[
( eA0)) according
to Observation 3 (as no other node not inM22 (
eA) can possibly become a member
of M22 (
eA0)). 
As a result of Lemma 12, we further rene our initial choice of eA so that it
satises the following assumption.
Assumption 3 Arc set eA is such that it rst satises Assumption 2 and then
lexicographically minimizes (j
( eA)j; j( eA)j).
Corollary 13 Any arc set eA satisfying Assumption 3 must satisfy 
( eA) = ;.

An arc set eA in graph G() that satises Assumption 3 is said to be derived
from . Without loss of generality, our coalitional deviation  is considered to
have been chosen so that it satises the following assumption.
Assumption 4 Coalitional deviation  dening minimal deviation graph G()
is such that the arc set eA derived from  gives lexicographical minimum V () :=
(jW0( eA)j; jM22 ( eA)j; j
( eA)j; j( eA)j).
Lemma 14 Let minimal deviation graph G() with  satisfying Assumption 4
be given. For any ` 2 X6, there is j 6= `, which we shall call a company of `,
such that ( eQ (`); j) 2 eA and j 2M 00nW .
Proof. Given ` 2 X6 and `1 = Q+(`)nW . Since a`1 = b`1 + 1 according to
the denition of X6, we have 
+(`1) = b`1 and hence
eQ+(`1) = Q+(`1) since
a`1 = 
+(`1) + 1 according to Observation 3. Since b`1 > 1 and
eQ+(`1) =
Q+(`1) 6 W (again according to the denition of X6), we let j 2 eQ+(`1)nW .
Then j 6= ` since otherwise we would have ` 2 
( eA), contracting Corollary 13
with our Assumption 3.
We claim j 2M 00 and hence are done. Let us assume for a contradiction that
j 2M 0. Note that with f`; `1; jg replacing fi; i1; jg in the denition of ( eA), we
conclude that ` 2 ( eA). Now let us dene a new coalitional deviation 0 so that
its derived arc set eA0 gives a V (0) = (jW0( eA0)j; jM22 ( eA0)j; j
( eA0)j; j( eA0)j) that
is lexicographically smaller than V () = (jW0( eA)j; jM22 ( eA)j; j
( eA)j; j( eA)j), a
desired contraction to Assumption 4.
In fact, let 0 be dened as in Observation 4 after node i has been replaced
by ` in the statement of Observation 4. Denote A0 as the arc set of the resulting
minimal deviation graph G(0). Let eA0 be the natural result of eA after the re-
orientation from  and 0, i.e., an arc in eA pointing to ` (resp. j) will become
an arc in eA0 pointing to j (resp. `). Other arcs are the same for eA and eA0.
Apparently,
jW0( eA0)j = jW0( eA)j; jM22 ( eA0)j = jM22 ( eA)j:
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On the other hand, if the value of j
( eA0)j has increased from j
( eA)j, then clearly
it must be the result of ` and/or j becoming element(s) of 
( eA0). In any such
case (say, the former case for the sake of argument), based on the denition
of 
( eA0), we can use the approach in Lemma 12 to nd h 2 H` as dened in
(9) and perform an arc-swap as in (10) with i and i1 replaced by ` and `1,
respectively, to reduce j
( eA0)j while maintaining the values of jW0( eA0)j and
jM22 ( eA0)j. For convenience, we still use eA0 to denote the tilde-valid arc set after
such arc-swap(s) if needed. Consequently, we have

( eA0) = 
( eA) = ;:
However, we claim
j( eA0)j < j( eA)j; (11)
a desired contradiction. To see inequality (11), we rst note that (i) any 2-path
in ( eA) starting at i 6= `; j is also a 2-path in ( eA0), and vice versa, and (ii)
any 2-path in ( eA) (resp. ( eA0)) starting at ` (resp. j) must have the rst arc
(`; `1) (resp. (j; eQ+(j)nW ), since j eQ+(j)nW j = 1 due to j 2 fM22 nX3). On the
other hand, the following can be easily observed:
1. If (`; `1; j
0) 2 ( eA) (j0 6= j), then (`; `1; j0) 2 ( eA0), and vice versa.
2. If (j; j1; j
0) 2 ( eA) (j0 6= `), then (j; j1; j0) 2 ( eA0), and vice versa.
3. (`; `1; j) 2 ( eA)n( eA0), since (`; `1; j) 2 ( eA0) would imply (`1; j) 2 eA0 
A0 by denition of ( eA0) and hence (`1; `) 2 A by denition of A0, which
in turn implies that (`1; `) 2 eA since b`1 = +(`1) under eA. Consequently,
we obtain ` 2 
( eA), contradicting Corollary 13.
4. With similar reasons for (`; `1; j) 62 ( eA0), we have (j; j1; `) 62 ( eA0).
Therefore, overall ( eA0) contains at least one element less than ( eA) as indi-
cated in points 3 and 4 above. 
Corollary 15 Let X61 := fj 2 MnX : node j is a company of `g) and Y6 :=S
`2X6((
eQ+(`)nW ) [X61. Then Y6 M 00nW and 2jX6j  jY6j.
Proof. For any ` 2 X6, if j is a company of `, then j cannot be a company of
`0 2 X6, `0 6= `, because of the uniqueness of eQ (`), eQ (`0) and eQ (j), which
implies the inequality 2jX6j  jY6j. 
Now let us look at the six sets Y1, . . . , Y6, dened in this subsection. Ac-
cording to Lemmas 7{11 and Corollary 15, we have
Y1 =W1 WnX; Y5 M12 \M 0nW MnX;
Y2; Y3; Y4; Y6 M 00nW MnX;
and
Yt  eQ+(Xt); t = 2; 3; 4;
Y6  eQ+(X6) [ eQ+(MnX):
Consequently, noticing eQ+(j) \ eQ+(j) = ;, we conclude that
Yt \X = ; and Yt \ Ys = ;; s 6= t; s; t 2 f1; : : : ; 6g: (12)
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4 Establishment of Strong Stability
We are now ready to enter the nal stage of establishing the desired approxima-
bility as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any minimal deviation graph G(m) involving m servers, its
improvement ratio IR(m)  5=4.
Proof. Let r = IR(m). Denote m
b
a = jM baj for all possible pairs a and b:
2  a  m and 0  b  a. Then according to (1) and (6), we have
mX
a=2
aX
b=0
mba = m; and
mX
a=2
aX
b=0
bmba = m: (13)
According to the denition of IR, we have rL0j  Li. Summing up these in-
equalities over all m arcs in eA leads to
mX
j=1
rL0j 
mX
i=1
biLi;
which implies that
r 
mP
i=1
biLi
mP
i=1
Li
: (14)
According to Observations 1 and 2, 1  Li  ai=(ai   1)  2, which together
with the denition of IR, implies that the right-hand side of (14) is between
1 and 2, which in turn implies that it is a decreasing function of Li for which
bi = 0 or bi = 1, and an increasing function of Li for which bi  2. Therefore,
r 
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
ab
a 1m
b
a +
mP
a=2
m1a
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
a
a 1m
b
a +
mP
a=2
m1a +
mP
a=2
m0a
;
which together with (13) implies that
r 
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
b
a 1m
b
a +m
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
1
a 1m
b
a +m
:
To show r  5=4, it suces to show
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
b
a 1m
b
a +m
mP
a=2
aP
b=2
1
a 1m
b
a +m
 5
4
;
which is equivalent to
mX
a=2
aX
b=2
4b  5
a  1 m
b
a  m;
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or (due to (13))
0 
mX
a=2
m1a +
mX
a=2
aX
b=2

b  4b  5
a  1

mba;
that is
m22 +
1
2
m33 
mX
a=2
m1a +
1
2
m23 +
mX
a=4
aX
b=2

b  4b  5
a  1

mba: (15)
In what follows, we are to prove (15) above based on our bounds derived in
Section 3.3. Since X2 M33 , the left-hand side of inequality (15) is at most
jXj   1
2
jM33 j 
6X
t=1
jXtj   1
2
jX2j: (16)
On the other hand, if we let
Y 0t := fi 2 Yt : bi = 1g and Y 00t := YtnY 0t ; for t = 2; 3; 4; 6;
which imply
Y 004 = fi 2 Y4 : bi  2; ai  bi + 2g 
[
2ba 2
M ba;[
t2f2;3;4;6g
Y 0t [ Y1 [ Y5 
[
a2
M1a ;[
t2f2;3;6g
Y 00t 
[
2b<a
M ba;
then noticing the properties (12) and that
b  4b  5
a  1 

1
2 ; if 2  b < a;
1; if 2  b  a  2;
we see that the right-hand side of inequality (15) is at least
jY1j+ jY5j+
X
t2f2;3;4;6g
jY 0t j+
1
2
X
t2f2;3;6g
jY 00t j+ jY 004 j
 jY1j+ 1
2
jY2j+ 1
2
jY3j+ jY4j+ jY5j+ 1
2
jY6j;
which is at least the right-hand side of inequality (16) according to Lemmas 7{11
and Corollary 15, which in turn ultimately leads to inequality (15). 
With Theorem 1 and the simple example of a coalitional deviation 3 in-
volving m = 3 servers with IR(3) = 5=4 presented in [7], we establish the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 In the m-server load balancing game (m  3), any NE is a (5=4)-
approximate SNE and the bound is tight.
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5 Concluding Remarks
By establishing a tight bound of 5=4 for the approximation of general NEs
to SNEs in the m-server load balancing game for m  3, we have closed the
nal gap for the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs. However,
as demonstrated by Feldman & Tamir [7] and by Chen [4], a special subset of
NEs known as LPT assignments, which can been easily identied as NEs [9], do
approximate SNEs better than general NEs. It is still a challenge to provide a
tight approximation bound for this subset of NEs.
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